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Mis-match of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial mis-invoicing of trade 
figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import 
restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in LDCs. In this paper we focus on the import under-invoicing due to high 
tariff barriers in a market where domestic producers compete with importers. Specifically, we examine how tariff levels, 
market structure and government intervention (in the form of intensity of monitoring and severity of penalties) affect the 
levels of under-invoicing. We also look at the optimal levels of import tariff and instruments of government intervention 
in these circumstances. 
 
 
JEL-Classification: F12, F13, L13 
 
Keywords: Import tariff, under-invoicing, Cournot oligopoly. 
 
 




Many developing countries impose high import tariff barriers to protect their domestic 
industries and precious foreign exchange reserves by restricting imports to the domestic 
economy.  This  induces  importers  in  developing  countries  to  underreport  or  ‘under-
invoice’ their imports in order to evade tariffs. Governments in these countries respond 
by putting in place monitoring mechanisms to detect and penalize such importers. This 
paper  examines  the  consequence  of  attempts  to  control  import  under-invoicing  in  a 
market where domestic producers and importers are engaged in Cournot competition. The 
optimal  tariffs  as  well  as  the  optimal  intensity  of  monitoring  and  penalties  are  also 
investigated.  
  The  technique  of  detecting  faked  invoicing  through  the  cross-checking  of 
domestic trade data with respect to the one obtained from the partner country statistics 
was initiated by Morgenstern (1963). He first tried to prove that there existed corrupt 
activities  among  the  international  traders  and  went  on  to  measure  the  extent  of 
misreporting using the partner country statistics. Naya and Morgan (1969) applied the 
technique of partner country data comparisons to Asian countries. In his paper on the 
invoicing  of  Turkish  import,  Bhagwati  (1964)  explicitly  linked  up  the  discrepancies 
between the import data of Turkey and the export data of her partner countries to the 
economic rationale that import duties higher than the black market premium on foreign 
exchange provided a systematic reason to under-invoice the import carrying those high 
duties.  Possible  techniques  for  detecting  smuggling  were  also  found  in  the  paper  on 
Indonesia by Simkin (1970) where the difficulties of accessing unrecorded trade were   3 
discussed.  Cooper  (1974)  analyzed  the  smuggling  phenomena  by  setting  the  market 
prices of imported goods against the tariff-inclusive prices. If the later price exceeded the 
former, it was presumed that the goods were being smuggled and tariffs evaded. 
Recently, it has been shown in the context of a simple export under-invoicing 
model that under-invoicing in India fell significantly as a result of devaluation (Marjit et 
al). Biswas and Marjit (2005), shows, by comparing Indian official trade statistics with 
corresponding  developed  country  figures,  that  India’s  export  and  import  figures  have 
always been underreported during 1960-98, barring a few exceptional years. They show 
in the context of a trade mis-invoicing model that that the exporter will under (over) 
invoice exports if the gain from selling the unreported export at the market exchange rate 
outweighs (falls short of ) the loss in export subsidy. Similarly, an importer will under 
(over)invoice imports if the benefits of escaping high tariffs outweighs (falls short of) the 
loss  from  buying  the  foreign  currency  at  the  market  exchange  rate.  The  paper  also 
considers a punishment function that is increasing and convex in the size of misreporting. 
Other works in this area (Zdanowich et al, 1995, Patnaik and Vasudevan, 2000 
and  Loungani  and  Mauro,  2000)  have  tried  to  relate  trade  mis-invoicing  with  illegal 
movements of foreign exchange termed ‘capital flight’. In a three country preferential – 
non  preferential  trade  model  Biswas  and  Marjit  (2007)  show  that  the  low  tariff 
preferential trade channel induces capital flight while the high tariff non preferential trade 
channel is conducive to illegal foreign exchange transactions in the domestic market. 
It is important to observe that over the past couple of decades many developing 
countries have shifted to a system of flexible exchange rate where the exchange rate is 
market  determined  with  very  little  intervention  by  the  Central  Bank.  An  obvious   4 
consequence of this system has been the gradual loss in significance of the so called 
‘black market premium’ (BMP) for foreign exchange. However, protectionist tariffs as 
well  as  export  subsidies,  although  lowered  substantially  as  a  result  of  WTO 
commitments,  remain  significantly  high,  providing  developing  country  traders  with 
motivation to mis-invoice.  
It  may  therefore  be  important  to  understand  the  consequences  of  government 
policies  –  both  tariff  rates  and  monitoring  along  with  penalty  levels  chosen  by  the 
government to control mis-invoicing - on the level of trade as well as mis-invoicing in a 
flexible exchange rate regime.  
In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  simple  model  of  short  run  Cournot  competition 
between given number of domestic producers and importers of a homogeneous good, 
where the importers have a propensity to under-invoice imports to avoid high tariffs. The 
government, in response, monitors imports through a system that detects under-invoicing 
with a probability depending on the level monitoring intensity (or expenditure). It also 
imposes a penalty that is increasing in the amount of under-invoicing. 
We find that the rate of import under-invoicing is increasing in the tariff rate and 
decreasing  in  the  monitoring  intensity  and  severity  of  penalty.  In  our  simple  linear 
Cournot structure, the output produced in the domestic firms is increasing and the amount 
marketed by the importers is decreasing in the level of the import tariff. However, in our 
simple linear Cournot structure neither is affected by the level of monitoring intensity or 
the severity of the penalty. Further, while monitoring intensity and the rate of penalty 
negatively  affect  the  importers’  profits,  it  fails  to  influence  the  profitability  of  the 
domestic  producers.  More  interestingly,  while  a  higher  tariff  will  raise  the  profits  of   5 
domestic producers, it does not necessarily hurt the importers particularly if the number 
of domestic producers is small relative to importers. Finally, as the welfare initially rises 
and  subsequently  falls  as  a  result  of  rising  tariffs  or  monitoring  intensity,  it  implies 
optimal  tariff  and  monitoring  intensity  levels  exist.  But  the  welfare  is  monotonically 
increasing  in  the  severity  of  penalty.  Consequently,  unless  considerations  other  than 
optimality  are  introduced,  it  would  be  possible  to  make  penalties  increasingly  severe 
which can completely wipe out the under-invoicing phenomenon. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the model. Section III 
studies the implications of Cournot competition on the rate of under-invoicing, prices, 
quantities and profits given the government policy instruments like tariffs, monitoring 
intensity  and  the  penalty  function.  Section  IV  introduces  welfare  considerations  and 




There  is  a  single  homogeneous  product  q  that  may  either  be  produced  at  home  or 
imported from abroad. The domestic industry is assumed to have a constant unit cost of 
production and the production function can be written as:  
                        d d cq q c   ) (                                                                                               (1) 
and  the  domestic  currency  augmented international    price  is  p . We  assume  that  the 
exchange rate is perfectly flexible with no difference between the official and the market 
exchange rate. The government can set an import tariff at the rate t. Then the domestic   6 
cost of obtaining  f q  of the product for the importer, who does not under-invoice imports, 
becomes 
                     f f q p t q c ) 1 ( ) (                                                                                             (2) 
We propose a short run Cournot competition between importers and domestic producers 
and assume  that  the  numbers  of  firms  are  fixed.  So let there be  m producers  of  the 
domestic good. If the fixed number of importers is n and the firms compete in quantities, 
the (inverse) demand functions for the product can be written as 
                       f d nq mq a p                                                                                       (3)  
where p is  the domestic price of the homogeneous domestic and foreign products. 
The rate of tariff protection is presumably high for the importers and they indulge into 
corrupt practices by hiding part of import values and gain from tariff evasion. The rate of 
under-invoicing Įj (for import firm j) is assumed to be the same, Į for all importing firms 
as they are identical in all respects. Thus if qf and  f q ~  are the true and reported level of 
import (or output) by an importer, we have 
                                      0 , ) 1 ( ~ !    D D f f q q                                                        (4) 
The  government,  on  its  part,  has  a  monitoring  effort  that  allows  it  to  choose  the 
probability,  ĳ,  with  which  it  can  detect  any  arbitrary  instance  of  under-invoicing  of 
imports. ĳLVD function of the monitoring expenditure, r, and does not depend upon the 
amount of under-invoicing. Specifically, we assume that, 
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where K is an arbitrary constant. Note that the function ĳ(r) has the following properties: 
             0           , 0           , 1 ) (         , 0 ) 0 (  c c ! c o f   M M M M                                                   (6)   7 
as shown in figure 1. 
The penalty for under-invoicing, if detected is assumed to be increasing and convex in 
the amount of evasion. In particular, it is assumed that the punishment cost, S is  
                                
2 . . f q s S D                                                                                        (7) 
where s is a policy variable chosen by the government. 
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Figure 1: Probability of detection as a function of monitoring expenditure 
 
Note that the above structure implies that (i) if there are several small evasions 
that add up to the size of one large evasion, there is a much larger probability of being 
detected,  and  (ii)  the  penalty  for  the  large  evasion,  if  detected,  is  larger  than  the 
probabilities of the small evasions. 
Initially, the government sets the tariff rate, t, the monitoring expenditure, r and 
the penalty variable, s to maximize welfare. The domestic firm chooses its output, qd, 
while  the  importers  simultaneously  choose  f f q q ~     and    ,  the  amount  of  actual  and 
reported imports (if there is quantity competition).    8 
III. Import under-invoicing, outputs and profits 
 
In this section, we analyze the market outcomes – i.e., prices, quantities and profits – as 
well  as  the  amount  of  under-invoicing  following  the  assumptions  of  given  market 
structure (price or quantity competition, number of importers etc) and values of policy 
variables,  t, s  and r.  This  is done keeping  in  mind  the  familiar  method  of  solving  a 
multistage game by a process of backward induction. 
We initially assume that the m domestic firms and the n importers of the foreign 
product compete in quantities. Given values of the policy variables – t, m and r, they 
choose qd,  D     and    f q  to maximize; 
               d f d d
d cq nq mq a q      3                                                                               (8) 
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The first order conditions of the problem are: 
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From (12) we readily obtain 
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resulting in the following: 
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And from (14) and (15), we ultimately obtain 
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This eventually leads to our first proposition. 
Proposition 1: An increase in import tariff causes - 
(a) rise in production of each domestic firm;  
(b) fall in import made by each importer and  
(c) rise in the rate of  under-invoicing of imports, i.e.,  
0
*












dq f d                                                                            (17a). 
An increase in monitoring intensity (or expenditure) and stiff penalties have no effects on 
either domestic output or actual imports. However, it lowers the rate of under-invoicing.  
0
* * * *




















                                                                                                       (17c). 
It is easy to see that a higher price of the importable as well as a higher tariff rate raises 
the cost of imports and hence lowers imports along with raising domestic production (by 
shifting  their  reaction  functions  outward).  It  is  also  evident  that  (with  no  change  in 
monitoring efforts or penalties) raising the tariff rate induces the importers to increase the 
rate of under-invoicing as the benefits increase by more than costs. For the same reason 
(given the same tariff rate) increase in monitoring intensity and penalties reduces under-
invoicing.     10 
What is interesting, however, is that the neither the quantity of output produced 
by domestic firms nor the quantity imported and marketed by importers is affected by a 
change in the monitoring intensity or the stiffness of penalty. This indicates that the entire 
impact  of  the  rise  in  penalties  or  monitoring  intensity  is  absorbed  by  the  importers 
through  lowering  the  rate  of  under-LQYRLFLQJ Į,  without  any  change  in  the  level  of 
imports. Consequently, there is no change in their reaction functions and the equilibrium 
outputs of both parties remain unaltered. This is also clear from the first order condition 
of equation (12). We can write this as 
f q s r p t . ) ( 2 . D M   .                                                                                              (12a) 
LHS is neither affected by a change in r or s. In the RHS, Į must change in the opposite 
direction to respond any change in r and/ or s. This is required to keep marginal benefit 
equal to marginal cost in (12a). 
Intuitively,  as  qf  is  the  actual  quantity  of  imports,  it  should  not  be  affected  by  the 
monitoring  intensities  or  the  severity  of  punishment.  These  two  government  policy 
instruments are required to monitor and subsequently punish the dishonest importers, if 
caught. The probability of getting caught will depend upon the rate and amount of under-
invoicing and not on actual value of imports. Hence, if r or s increases, Į would fall, 
keeping qf unchanged which can only be affected by the tariff rate‘t’. 
           Next, substituting (14), (15) and (16) into (8) and (9) we obtain: 
                              2 * ) *
d (q d   3                                                                                     (18) 
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This leads to our second proposition.   11 
Proposition 2: Profit of the domestic firm varies directly with the rate of import tariff; 
however, it does not depend either on the monitoring intensity or the stiff penalty cost,  
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Profit  of  importers  varies  inversely  with  the  monitoring  intensity  and  stiffness  of  the 
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Intuitively, from Proposition 1, changes in the monitoring intensity or stiffness of 
penalties  do  not  affect  the  output  marketed  by  either  the  importers  or  the  domestic 
producers. Hence it is easy to see that the profits of the domestic firms are not affected by 
the intensity of monitoring or stiffness of penalties. An increase in the tariff rate, of 
course lowers imports and benefits domestic producers as the cost of imports goes up. 
  Again, Proposition 2 shows that the importers would lower the rate of under-
invoicing without any change in the quantity of imports given any increase in monitoring 
intensity or stiffness of penalties. It is then easy to justify that this situation leads to a 
lower profit for them.  
What is most remarkable in this model is that an increase in the tariffs does not 
necessarily hurt the importers. An increase in tariffs lowers imports for each importer 
while at the same time the rate of under-invoicing increases. If the number of domestic 
producers (m) is low relative to the number of importers (n), the domestic output rises 
much less than the contraction in the amount of imports. As a result the domestic price of 
the commodity would experience a greater hike than what is anticipated following a tariff   12 
escalation. The importers then may benefit more from higher price as well as higher 
under-invoicing compared to the loss due to lower quantity imported. 
 
IV. Welfare and Public Policy 
 
Welfare  of  a  country  under  the  setup  of  our  model  will  depend  upon  the  following 
variables: consumer surplus, profit of the domestic firms, earning from the tariff revenue, 
cost of monitoring for tariff evasion by the importers and earning from penalty drawn on 
the under-invoicing importers. The following equation captures the welfare function: 
                            3    r f ĮQT t( p d m CS W 1 n
2 ) )( ( f q r s D I                               (21). 
Differentiating (21) with respect to s, r and t we have, 
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        (24). 
This leads to our third and final proposition. 
Proposition  3:  Welfare  is  increasing  in  the  severity  of  the  penalty,  s.  However, 
increasing monitoring intensity, r, or the tariff rate, t, increases welfare only up to a 
point, beyond which any increase in r or t reduces welfare. 
Equation (22) indicates  0 !
ds
dw
as all terms in the right hand side are positive. Raising the 
stiffness  of  penalties  does  not  affect  domestic  producers.  It  only  negatively  affects   13 
importers  profits  without  lowering  their  actual  output.  The  government  as  a  result 
benefits  by  collecting  higher  penalties.  Since  welfare  in  our  structure  includes 
government revenues but not importers’ profits, a rise in the penalty rate clearly raises 
welfare. 
But this also means that unlike many models of pecuniary punishment there is no optimal 
severity of penalty in this structure.  In fact, from (7) and (16), it is easy to see that 
making s infinitely large would reduce the rate of under-invoicing, Į to zero, which is 
clearly the optimal solution. This is shown in Figure 2. The reason, we cannot impose 
such extremely high penalties in practice, is that the legal system places more emphasis 
on the “fairness” than on the “optimality” of the punishment – i.e. it attempts to ensure 
that  “the  punishment  fits  the  crime”.    In  other  words  there  is  usually  an  external 
constraint on the punishment that would be “justified” for any given amount of under-
invoicing.  
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Figure 2: The maximum severity of penalty considered ‘fair’ 
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 > < 1. It implies that unlike s, W is not monotonically 
increasing in r. A rise in monitoring intensity hurts only the importers at the cost of 
government revenue – much in the same fashion as the penalty rate. However, unlike the 
case of the penalty rate, raising monitoring intensity is costly for the government. A rise 
in r (i) lowers the rate of under-LQYRLFLQJĮLLUDLVHVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIGHWHFWLRQĳ(r)  as 
well as (iii) the cost of monitoring.  It is easy to check that, since from (5) and (13) that 
) (r Mc and   Į are positive and very high for r = 0, we have from (23) that 
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This means that although welfare is increasing in monitoring intensity when monitoring 
intensity is low, there is an  optimum value for r beyond which any increase in r would 
cause domestic welfare to fall as shown in the following figure. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between monitoring expenditure and welfare.   15 
 
Similar argument can be put forward for equation (24) as well. It is easy to verify that as 
usual  welfare  is  initially  increasing  and  subsequently  declining  in  tariff  so  that  it  is 






 We study the implications of government policies to control import under-invoicing in a 
simple linear Cournot model that leads to some interesting results. Among these are the 
results that (a) raising the tariff levels do not always hurt the importers and (b) in the 
absence  of  any  exogenous  or  “social’  bounds  on  the  severity  of  penalty  for  under-
invoicing it would be possible to raise penalties to wipe out under-invoicing altogether. 
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